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Abstract: Models not only represent but may also influence their targets 
in important ways. While models’ abilities to influence outcomes has been 
studied in the context of economic models, often under the label ‘per-
formativity’, we argue that this phenomenon also pertains to epidemio-
logical models, such as those used for forecasting the trajectory of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. After identifying three ways in which a model by the 
Covid-19 Response Team at Imperial College London (Ferguson et al. 
2020) may have influenced scientific advice, policy, and individual re-
sponses, we consider the implications of epidemiological models’ per-
formative capacities. We argue, first, that performativity may impair mod-
els’ ability to successfully predict the course of an epidemic; but second, 
that it may provide an additional sense in which these models can be suc-
cessful, namely by changing the course of an epidemic. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers are increasingly scrutinising epidemiological models that 
have been used to forecast the trajectory of the Covid-19 pandemic 
(Horner and Symons 2020; Nguyen and Frigg 2021; Winsberg, Brennan, 
and Surprenant 2020; Schroeder 2021; van Basshuysen and White 2021). 
The success of these models is often evaluated in terms of their predictive 
accuracy (Friedman et al. 2021). We argue that there is an additional di-
mension along which epidemiological models can be successful, namely 
in influencing the course of an epidemic. Our argument draws on the con-
cept of ‘performativity’, which economic sociologists and philosophers of 
economics have used to highlight the fact that economic models may not 
only represent parts of the economy, but can also influence the behav-
iours of the economic systems modelled (Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2006; 
Guala 2007; Mäki 2013; Boldyrev and Ushakov 2016). This notion has a 
long history in philosophy of science (see Buck 1963), economics, and the 
social sciences (see Henshel 1993), where it is often referred to as ‘reflex-
ive prediction’ (Buck 1963; Henshel 1993).1 Predictions (or ‘prophecies’) 
can be ‘self-fulfilling’ or ‘self-defeating’, understood broadly to mean that 
the dissemination of the prediction is causally relevant in either bringing 
about the event predicted or in preventing it from occurring (Buck 1963). 
We similarly understand the notion of performativity in a broad way; 
models perform by changing important properties of the phenomena they 
are representing (see Mäki 2013).2 Whereas earlier accounts tended to fo-
cus on the negative aspects of this phenomenon (particularly the difficul-
ties it poses for accurate prediction), contemporary work on performa-
tivity also emphasises potential positive aspects, particularly how an un-
derstanding of performativity can allow us to intervene constructively in 
the economy (Guala 2007). 
While there has been sustained discussion of the performativity of 
economic models, the question of whether epidemiological models might 
be performative has thus far been neglected.3 We aim to make a first step 
 
1 Ian Hacking (1999) describes a related phenomenon involving social kinds. 
2 Mäki himself is critical of attempts to characterize this type of phenomenon in the 
context of economic modelling in terms of Austin’s notion of performativity, arguing 
that Austin’s notion is concerned with acts being constituted by certain utterances. By 
contrast, according to Mäki, economic theorizing may have causal consequences for eco-
nomic activity without being constitutive of it. We set aside the question of whether 
Austin’s notion is apt in this context here; rather, we wish simply to draw attention to 
the fact that, like economic models, epidemiological models can have causal effects on 
the systems modelled. 
3 Some social scientists have described epidemiological models as performative (Rhodes 
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towards closing this gap by arguing, first, that epidemiological models 
can be performative in several ways, and second, that this has important 
implications for how these models should be regarded and evaluated. We 
proceed as follows: after sketching some important features of epidemi-
ological models, we focus on a model that was used by researchers at 
Imperial College London (ICL) to forecast the pandemic in the UK and the 
US (Ferguson et al. 2020). On the basis of this example, and focused par-
ticularly on its use in the UK, we identify three ways in which models may 
be performative: (i) models may influence policy advising; (ii) models may 
affect policy-makers’ responses to an epidemic; and (iii) models may di-
rectly influence individual responses to an epidemic. While (i) and (ii) are 
well-documented in the case of the ICL model, (iii) is more speculative.4 
Having identified the ways in which epidemiological models can be per-
formative, we elaborate upon the ways in which their performative as-
pects may complicate the task of successfully forecasting the course of 
an epidemic. At the same time, however, we contend, their performative 
abilities provide an additional way in which these models can be success-
ful, namely by changing the course of an epidemic. 
 
II. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL MODELS 
Epidemiological models are among the instruments that policy-makers 
have used (and continue to use) when making policy decisions during the 
Covid-19 pandemic. These models provide highly idealized representa-
tions of how the virus will spread through a population, under a variety 
of assumptions. 
The simplest models are SIR or SEIR models, which assign members 
of a population to different subgroups, ‘the Susceptible’, ‘Infectious’, ‘Re-
moved/Recovered’, and, in the case of SEIR models, also the ‘Exposed’. 
SIR and SEIR models consist of several deterministic equations that de-
scribe how the proportional sizes of the different subgroups change with 
time based on transition rates between these groups. These rates are rep-
resented by a small number of parameters: the transmission rate, the re-
covery rate, and the latency period. SIR or SEIR models are macroscopic 
models that treat populations as a whole and abstract from interactions 
 
et al. 2020), but their focus differs from ours, as their main concern is that we should 
adapt these models to the changing circumstances. 
4 The first two types of ‘performativity’ we outline could apply to any model that is used 
to inform policy, whereas the third sense is more distinctive and methodologically in-
teresting, and it is on this notion that most theorists focus (see, for example, the articles 
in MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007). 
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among individuals and transmission events. The model used by the Im-
perial College London to model the global evolution of the pandemic in 
different regions of the world is a SEIR model (Walker et al. 2020). 
By contrast, the ‘CovidSim’ model discussed in the highly influential 
Report 9 by the Imperial College Covid-19 Response Team, upon which 
we will chiefly focus here, is an individual-based model (Ferguson et al. 
2020), in which individuals are assigned to different types of location 
where contacts occur—within the household, at school, in the workplace, 
and in the wider community. CovidSim models transmission events 
through contacts among individuals at these locations and movements 
between locations to derive the evolution of infection numbers. CovidSim 
is a stochastic model containing a very large number of parameters, many 
of which are only poorly constrained by empirical data. But a sensitivity 
analysis (Edeling et al. 2021) has shown that the model is particularly sen-
sitive to variations in three parameters: the length of the latent period in 
which a patient has no symptoms and is not infectious; the delay to start 
case isolation; and, the ‘relative spatial contact rate given social distanc-
ing’ parameter, which captures the effectiveness of social distancing (this 
last parameter will be particularly important in what follows). 
 
III. THREE PERFORMATIVE ASPECTS OF THE ICL MODEL 
In the following, we will outline three salient ways in which epidemiolog-
ical models (with a particular focus on the above-mentioned, much-dis-
cussed ICL model presented in Report 9) might be thought to have influ-
enced the course of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
 
III.I. The ICL Model Performed Scientific Advising 
In a recent working paper, Jonathan Birch (2020) documents how the pro-
vision of scientific advice in the UK evolved in the lead up to the intro-
duction of the ICL model used in Report 9 (Ferguson et al. 2020). He sug-
gests that the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)—the 
group chiefly responsible for guiding the UK’s initial pandemic re-
sponse—dispensed advice in three distinctive forms during March 2020. 
They began by providing advice in the form of what Birch (2020, 6) refers 
to as “no unconditional recommendations”: that is, they presented a list 
of potentially effective means of pursuing a variety of goals that policy-
makers might have, with no indication of which goals might be desirable 
or worthy of pursuit. As the situation worsened, by March 9, SAGE shifted 
to providing advice in the form of “disjunctive unconditional 
VAN BASSHUYSEN, WHITE, KHOSROWI, AND FRISCH / HOW PANDEMIC MODELS PERFORM 
 
 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS aa 
recommendations” (Birch 2020, 6); endorsing a specific end but leaving 
open a variety of means for achieving this end. For example, during this 
period, they outlined a range of non-pharmaceutical interventions that 
they believed could, in some combination, achieve epidemic mitigation, 
and recommended that some subset of these measures be implemented 
(SAGE 2020a). On March 18, shortly after SAGE had begun to discuss the 
ICL modelling paper, the form of advice shifted again, to a “single uncon-
ditional recommendation” (Birch 2020, 6), namely, that school closures 
were immediately required in order to prevent the NHS from becoming 
overwhelmed (SAGE 2020b). 
Birch traces this trajectory in order to argue that the latter form of 
advice, while perhaps not appropriate in normal situations, is appropriate 
in fast-moving crisis situations. But he also comments in passing on a 
possible reason for this final shift to advice in the form of a single uncon-
ditional recommendation. Namely, two days before issuing their single 
unconditional recommendation (on March 16), the SAGE team discussed 
the ICL modelling paper for the first time. This paper displayed data 
about critical care capacity in the same graph as projections about de-
mand for critical care in the absence of strict suppression measures (Fig-
ure 1), revealing, in stark form, the extent to which demand was predicted 
to outstrip supply, even with existing mitigation measures in place. Birch 
suggests that this might have been the first time that some SAGE mem-
bers were made aware of the dramatic size of the mismatch. The ICL mod-
ellers also included a single unconditional recommendation in the report 
on the basis of their projections: “Epidemic suppression is the only viable 
strategy at the current time” (Ferguson et al. 2020, 16). It is possible, then, 
that this model—particularly through the graphical representation of its 
results5—was instrumental in shaping the form of the scientific advice 
provided by SAGE. 
 
III.II. The Model Performed Policy-Makers’ Responses to the Pandemic 
It is clear that the ICL model had a significant impact on public policy in 
the UK; on March 16, immediately following the release of Report 9, the 
UK drastically altered (Bosely 2020) its previous, mitigation-based strat-
egy (DHSC 2020), and almost all of the ICL team’s recommended 
measures were implemented in the following days (see van Basshuysen 
 
5 The ways in which graphical representations of models and their results may influence 
how these models are adopted is an important topic in the performativity literature; see, 
for instance, Pahl and Sparsam (2016) in the context of the IS-LM model.  
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and White, forthcoming). This may have further led, however, to some 
noteworthy interactions between the epidemiological models that pro-
vided a basis for policy advice, and the responses of policy-makers. The 
ICL model and models like it, which project the impact of various public 
policy measures, are designed to provide policy guidance. Their useful-
ness depends on their predictive performance. But the implementation of 
the modellers’ recommendations steers the course of the epidemic away 
from a model’s reference forecasts. This can lead to claims that the model 
is ‘too pessimistic’; that is, that its projections about what would happen 
in the absence of interventions or behaviour changes (but where mitiga-
tion measures are implemented) do not match the observed numbers of 
infected, hospitalized, and dead (see, for example, St. Onge and Campan 
2020). We might regard this as a distinctive instance of counterperforma-
tivity (see Mackenzie 2006)—the implementation of the recommended 
policies steers the real-world outcome away from the reference forecast, 
but notably, in the case of the ICL model, this was the exact effect that 
the modellers were hoping to achieve.6 
 
6 Although this phenomenon has led to criticism of such models for generating inaccu-
rate predictions, and comparison of reference forecasts to actual outcomes is used to 
evaluate the predictive accuracy of these models (see, for example, Friedman et al. 2021), 
it should be emphasised that the projection here is contingent on no measures being 
implemented (that is, this is a conditional prediction). It is helpful here to distinguish 
Figure 1: Projected demand for critical care beds under different possible mitigation-
based policies is displayed together with surge critical care bed capacity. Source: Fergu-
son et al. (2020). 
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Joseph Friedman et al. (2021) draw attention to another problem in 
their evaluation of the predictive performance of various international 
Covid-19 mortality forecasting models. They suggest that transmission-
based epidemiological models tend to overestimate transmission in their 
reference forecasts, because prolonged exponential growth in transmis-
sion rarely continues unabated—governments (and/or individuals, see be-
low) will change their behaviour in response to deteriorating circum-
stances—and, we contend, in response to updated modelling projections. 
The accuracy of modelling predictions and projections could be im-
proved, they argue, by taking such endogenous factors into account 
(which, as they note, are often explicitly included in economic analyses). 
In addition, they suggest that models (such as the ICL models) that aim 
to predict the impact of various public policy measures would be better 
evaluated by looking at the error in the difference between the reference 
forecast and the forecast for the implemented policy. Adequately model-
ling endogenous responses may be complicated, however, by the third 
performative aspect of epidemiological models discussed below. Moreo-
ver, as Friedman et al. (2021) concede, the relevant counterfactuals can 
be difficult to assess. Even when comparing the projection concerning the 
implemented policy to its actual effects, the effects of the policy must be 
somehow distinguished from other factors. It should, however, be noted 
that economists have made progress in recognising and incorporating en-
dogeneity into Covid-19 modelling, which, among other things, can assist 
in clarifying the role of government policy in disease dynamics (see Avery 
et al. 2020). 
The belief that models were inaccurate and overly pessimistic might 
have also had potential further follow-on effects for the implementation 
of the policy advice on the basis of further models. It is possible that the 
scepticism and controversy surrounding the ICL projections was one of 
the factors that contributed to a reluctance to implement a further, short 
term, ‘circuit-breaker’ lockdown when a second wave was unfolding in the 
 
predictions, which generate statements about future states of the actual world, from 
projections, which generate statements about counterfactual outcomes, conditional on 
some set of counterfactual assumptions. The performative effect of the model consists 
in influencing which member of a set of projections ends up most closely resembling 
the trajectory of the epidemic in the actual world and does not compromise its predictive 
accuracy. While the model steers the trajectory of the epidemic further away from the 
trajectory in the reference projection, this does not undermine the predictive accuracy 
of the model. Thus, this does not constitute the type of ‘self-defeating prediction’ that 
is the focus of much attention in the performativity literature, where, for example, the 
prediction that an imminent disaster will happen prevents this disaster from happening 
and thus undermines the accuracy of the prediction (see, for example, Henshel 1993). 
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UK in autumn 2020 (see Sayers 2020), which SAGE called for with increas-
ing urgency (Stewart and Sample 2020) on the basis of mathematical mod-
elling projections (SAGE 2020c). The refusal to implement this advice con-
stituted a significant break between scientific advisors and policy-makers 
in the UK (Stewart and Sample 2020). 
 
III.III. The Models May Have Performed Individual Responses to the 
Pandemic 
While epidemiological models have influenced individual behaviour 
through scientific advising and policy-making, they may have also been 
performative in a more direct way, by changing individual behaviour 
through information conveyed to the public. Individual behaviour during 
the pandemic was and is not simply determined by social-distancing and 
other public policy measures. Rather, how and whether social-distancing 
measures are taken up by individuals depends, to a significant extent, 
both on their willingness to comply with these measures and on how they 
interpret these measures. 
Obviously, the effectiveness of public policy measures depends on the 
public’s degree of compliance. For example, whether a policy restricting 
all social gatherings to the members of one household plus one additional 
person (a restriction in place in Germany through most of the pandemic) 
can contribute to a reduction in the reproduction rate 𝑅0 of the virus de-
pends on the extent to which people abide by this restriction. But the 
success of many public policy measures goes beyond the question of 
mere compliance. Many measures, such as many types of restrictions on 
social interactions, are compatible with a wide range of different social 
networks, including some quite extensive networks, and with a wide range 
of different types of spatial contacts among individuals. How such 
measures contribute to the slowing of the spread of the virus thus par-
tially depends on how individuals interpret a given policy and how they 
implement it in adjusting their interactions. There are many different 
ways, for example, of following the ‘one-household-plus-one-additional-
person’ rule: I might meet with a large number of different friends indi-
vidually night after night, who all have their own largely non-overlapping 
group of friends, with whom they also meet; or I might radically cut down 
on my social contacts and form an isolated ‘pod’ with just one other per-
son. Both behaviours comply with the rule, but the resulting social net-
works end up looking quite different. This is also the case in situations 
where explicit policy guidance is lacking—for example, the number of 
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infections that result from interactions in the workplace (which is one of 
the types of interaction explicitly modelled in the ICL model) will depend 
to some extent on how individuals adjust their behaviour in response to 
the model’s predictions. 
But to what extent individuals are willing to comply with policy 
measures, and how measures are interpreted and implemented in indi-
vidual behaviour, depends on how serious individuals take the threat pre-
sented by the pandemic to be. This in turn depends, at least partly, on the 
information the public receives concerning the pandemic—information 
that often prominently includes model projections in infection, reproduc-
tion, and fatality rates (for example, Boseley 2020). For instance, when 
people are provided with this information through some kind of graphical 
representation, such as the graph in Figure 1, depicting how the demand 
for critical care beds could greatly exceed capacity, this might make the 
urgency of the situation particularly salient, and it might lead to different 
reactions than if this information had been conveyed through other 
means. 
Thus, the predictions of epidemiological models and how these are 
understood by the public can play an important causal role in changing 
properties of the pandemic by influencing individual responses to the 
pandemic—a connection that is further underscored by the empirically 
well-supported assumption that people in many places reduced their con-
tacts in advance of the implementation of social distancing policies (for 
example, Friedson et al. 2020; Sears et al. 2020). That is, our modelling 
efforts may interact with the very quantities and properties we are trying 
to model and can thereby change them: epidemiological models and the 
quantities modelled by them exhibit what Ian Hacking has called a “loop-
ing effect” (1999, 105). 
For example, CovidSim contains a parameter representing the ‘relative 
spatial contact rate given social distancing’—a parameter representing 
the effectiveness of social distancing measures, which, as Edeling et al. 
(2021) have shown, is particularly influential in determining the model’s 
projections. To what extent the parameter value chosen provides an ade-
quate representation of the effect of social distancing measures depends 
on how the measures are implemented in individuals’ behaviour, which 
may be influenced by the model’s projections. 
Simpler models might not distinguish the institution of a policy from 
compliance with it, and simply model how universal compliance would 
affect infection rates. Yet in this case, too, the extent to which such a 
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model can provide adequate predictions concerning the effect of policy 
measures will depend on the degree to which the public abides with these 
measures. And the effectiveness of social distancing measures depends 
on how the model’s results are communicated to and understood by the 
public. 
 
IV. PERFORMATIVITY IN MODEL EVALUATION AND APPRAISAL 
With these three potentially performative aspects of epidemiological 
models established, we are now in a position to draw out two ways in 
which recognizing performativity can assist us in the evaluation of these 
models. We consider, first, how performative aspects may compound the 
difficult task of successfully forecasting the course of an epidemic and, 
second, how they might be assessed in light of their ability to change the 
course of an epidemic. 
Epidemiological models serve dual purposes: apart from their epis-
temic purpose of forecasting the course of an epidemic, they also serve 
the practical purpose of informing and guiding policy-making. These ep-
istemic and practical purposes go hand in hand: on the basis of forecasts, 
policy-makers can choose policies that are likely to prevent unwanted out-
comes. However, as we have seen in the previous section, the performa-
tivity of models complicates this task, because the implementation of 
these policies can steer the course of the epidemic away from the models’ 
reference forecasts and can influence the adequacy of assumptions con-
cerning the effectiveness of policy measures. If a modelling study does 
not include a range of scenarios reflecting different combinations of pol-
icies (some of which resemble those that will actually be implemented), 
some of the estimated parameters may turn out to be inaccurate due to 
the effects of the implemented policies (for example, levels of mobility), 
and the forecasts derived from the model may thus be inaccurate, too.  
To be sure, many of the models that have been used to forecast the 
course of the Covid-19 pandemic, including the ones we have focused on 
here (Ferguson et al. 2020; Walker et al. 2020), do include a range of sce-
narios which project the impact of different (combinations of) policies. 
This can generate projections that better resemble the actual policy tra-
jectories followed in a country, and models’ predictive accuracy can ac-
cordingly be assessed by comparing these projections with observed out-
comes (van Basshuysen and White 2021, forthcoming). However, gauging 
the accuracy of even these more pertinent scenario forecasts can face sig-
nificant limitations, due to the fact that most models abstract from 
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endogenous behavioural responses, such as when individuals engage in 
social distancing even before government-issued directives take effect, 
adopt more rigorous hygiene and personal protection protocols, cancel 
travel plans, and so on. Such behavioural responses are poorly under-
stood and difficult to anticipate (Friedman et al. 2021) and are thus diffi-
cult to incorporate into models (which is perhaps why extant models 
make no attempts to include them). Report 9, for instance, forecasts epi-
demic trajectories conditional on combinations of policies, but not on 
these types of spontaneous behavioural responses, potentially impairing 
the accuracy of important parameter values.7 Furthermore, even sincere 
efforts at estimating these parameters may be limited, as behavioural re-
sponses can change over time (such as when individuals become tired of 
social distancing directives and depart from recommended behaviours, 
or when the public perception of the trustworthiness of expert and model 
projections changes). Even where modellers endeavour to conscientiously 
estimate crucial empirical parameters, and to re-parameterize models on 
an iterative basis (as is done for some of the models we discuss), it might 
not be possible to completely overcome these epistemic difficulties. The 
performativity of models thus presents a serious challenge to their pre-
dictive capacities. 
However, while the performative aspects of epidemiological models 
can hamper their ability to successfully forecast the course of an epi-
demic, recognizing the performative dimension of these models can allow 
us to judge whether they have been successful in a second way, namely, 
by changing the course of an epidemic. That is, performativity may figure 
as an important criterion for appraisal beyond predictive accuracy. 
When models are performative, their dual roles as epistemic instru-
ments (that predict the evolution of a pandemic) and as practical instru-
ments (that inform policy-making through reference and scenario fore-
casts) can make it difficult to evaluate them with respect to each purpose 
individually. As we have discussed, the performative effects of these 
 
7 It should be noted that not all distortions due to spontaneous behavioural changes are 
the effect of performativity being in play. A distinction might be drawn between individ-
uals adapting their behaviour in response to model predictions, or in response to other 
kinds of information, such as current prevalence, which might be gathered and conveyed 
independently. It can be difficult, however, to determine which mechanisms are in play 
in a given case, as it might not be clear whether individuals’ sources of information 
include model results. For our point that performativity may exacerbate the task of fore-
casting, it suffices that individual behaviour is sometimes a response to model results, 
which should be uncontroversial, given that these results and their graphical represen-
tations have figured prominently in public perception (as outlined above). 
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models on policy and individual behaviour can drive outcomes away from 
the models’ predictions. When the predictions of models are undermined, 
moreover, this seems to undermine their epistemic credentials, making 
them unsuitable as a basis for public policy or individual behavioural re-
sponse. When we focus only on the predictive capacities of such models, 
we seem to be in a bind here—the more they steer policy and behaviour, 
the less suitable they seem as a basis for steering policy and behaviour 
(unless they endogenize behavioural response—although, as we have just 
pointed out, this can be difficult). 
One way out of this bind is to move model appraisal beyond focusing 
on models’ predictive performance alone. We thus suggest that both pre-
dictive and performative capabilities should be considered side-by-side 
when appraising epidemiological models. This could proceed by evaluat-
ing some forms of performativity as a desirable attribute (and others as 
undesirable) in all-things-considered assessments of what models have 
done for us, epistemically and practically. Following Philip Kitcher (for 
example, 2011) in understanding and evaluating science through the roles 
it plays in, and partly for, society (where those roles often extend beyond 
purely epistemic ones), we suggest that a more comprehensive assess-
ment of what epidemiological models have done for us (and whether they 
did a good job of it) should consider their performative aspects, too. 
To use an analogy, consider a medical doctor telling her patient that 
he is likely to die of a heart attack within the next decade if he continues 
smoking, drinking, and doing little exercise. Such a prediction can be per-
formative in helping the patient change his habits, allowing him to escape 
the unwanted prediction. Likewise, epidemiological models can have the 
performative ability to change important aspects of the phenomena they 
seek to capture. While this can adversely affect their predictive abilities, 
this does not necessarily imply that a model’s suitability, adequacy, or 
usefulness is diminished, if we consider its performative impact to be a 
potential virtue. Just as we should not think that a doctor is unqualified 
because she cannot tell whether a patient would indeed have died of a 
heart attack counterfactually, or because she cannot accurately forecast 
how much longer, exactly, a patient would live under a changed exercise 
regime, we suggest that it is unhelpful to assess the utility of epidemio-
logical models based on their predictive abilities alone. Epidemiological 
models have been a crucial resource for informing and justifying policy 
interventions, and may have contributed to shaping both the public’s un-
derstanding of the pandemic and their behavioural response to it. The 
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ability to make such performative contributions can be understood as a 
desirable feature of these models, even if models’ performativity can di-
minish their predictive prowess. 
It is important to stress, however, that not all forms of model per-
formativity are desirable. We might think, for instance, that some per-
formative successes of epidemiological models can also have unwanted 
side-effects, such as when some members of the public begin to take the 
difference between observed outcomes (such as cumulative mortality) 
and widely publicized pessimistic reference scenarios as reason to call 
the severity or reality of the phenomena being modelled into question. 
One might also worry that by choosing particular outcome variables as 
key modelling targets, such as critical care demand or cumulative mortal-
ity, models have been performative in making these outcomes relatively 
more salient than various economic, societal, or psychological endpoints, 
and that models might thereby have contributed to steering policy and 
public response in ways that led to suboptimal societal outcomes. We do 
not take a stance on which performative aspects are desirable or undesir-
able here, but rather highlight that it is important to take both kinds of 
factors into account. 
So how, exactly, are we to take models’ performative aspects into ac-
count? Unfortunately, numerous complications arise when detailing the 
potential role of performativity in model appraisal. Should it play an eval-
uative role, providing a criterion by which the merits or deficiencies of 
models can be judged? Or should it be prescriptive, recommending the 
construction, selection, or use of models with certain performative capac-
ities? The latter view seems highly problematic: we do not think that mod-
els can (or should) be made better by being made more performative, even 
if it were possible to agree that particular forms of performativity are 
socially desirable. Deceitfully meddling with a model in order to steer pol-
icy or behavioural response would raise significant concerns about illegit-
imate value-influences, and could severely undermine the epistemic cre-
dentials of models. Models are, and should remain, epistemic instruments 
in the first instance, and while some value-influences are rarely avoidable, 
model construction and use should proceed in epistemically responsible 
ways (see Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Parker and Winsberg 2018 for dis-
cussions of the roles of non-epistemic values in model construction and 
use). 
To allay such concerns, we need principles that allow us to 
acknowledge models’ performative aspects, good and bad, while 
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maintaining a commitment to the idea that models’ epistemic functioning 
should remain untouched by considerations about their performativity. 
Unfortunately, formulating such principles, and providing a detailed ac-
count of how exactly we should weigh or integrate models’ epistemic and 
performative aspects, involves various non-trivial questions that cannot 
be addressed here. These include: On which outcomes should we focus 
when gauging models’ performative effects? How should we weigh con-
siderations about models’ epistemic and performative aspects? Should 
epistemic considerations enjoy lexical priority, or are there cases where 
performative virtues may compensate for epistemic shortcomings? 
Should all performative aspects be considered in model appraisal, or are 
there cases where we should distinguish between the model-as-such, the 
practice of model-use, and issues of science communication about model 
outputs (where some evaluations of performativity should perhaps per-
tain only to the latter two but not the former)? We suggest, for now, only 
the following provisional safeguard: performativity should only play an 
evaluative, but not a prescriptive, role in model appraisal. It may figure in 
judgments concerning whether the downstream performative aspects of 
models have been desirable or undesirable, but such judgments should 
not bear on decisions made at the stage of model construction, selection, 
or deployment—there should be no wishful modelling. Navigating the ad-
ditional intricacies involved in formulating fine-grained principles is be-
yond the scope of this paper and must be addressed in future work. 
Finally, we would like to highlight a rather different (and less prob-
lematic) route to taking models’ performativity into account at the stage 
of model construction: instead of aiming to build models with specific 
performative goals in mind, we can aim to build models that endogenize 
their own performativity. Social scientists, as early as the 1950s, have 
made efforts to develop analytic machinery that can help anticipate the 
performative effects of public predictions (Grunberg and Modigliani 
1954; Simon 1954). Despite significant difficulties, there has been pro-
gress with attempts to incorporate endogeneity into epidemiological 
models (see, for example, Avery et al 2020; Eksin, Paarporn, and Weitz 
2019). Continuing these efforts could allow us not only to improve mod-
els’ predictive capabilities, but also to answer criticisms that social scien-
tists have been insufficiently involved in scientific advisory systems that 
inform policy. Social scientists could make an important contribution to 
the predictive endeavours undertaken by epidemiologists by helping 
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account for and anticipate the intricacies of the social and behavioural 
underpinnings that govern models’ performativity. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued that epidemiological models may have altered the course 
of the Covid-19 pandemic in three important respects: (i) through shaping 
the form of scientific policy advice, (ii) through shaping policy formation, 
and (iii) through influencing individual behavioural responses to the pan-
demic. Existing philosophical literature on epidemiological models and 
extant model evaluation studies have, however, focused primarily on pre-
dictive accuracy, and these performative aspects—and their implica-
tions—have been largely neglected. We have proposed that it may be im-
portant to take the performativity of models into consideration. This is, 
first, because it can exacerbate the difficulties involved in accurately pre-
dicting the course of a pandemic, and second, because certain types of 
performativity might be regarded as a desirable feature of epidemiologi-
cal models. It thus might be fruitful to consider, in addition to predictive 
accuracy, the ways in which we can assess the success of models based 
partially on their performative aspects, and the role these might play in 
our fight against the pandemic. 
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